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Abstract 
This paper discusses supply chain and logistics issues that arise in the operations of the 
Peacekeeping base of the United Nations in Brindisi. First, a conceptual introduction of 
current lean-agile and risk debates in the supply chain literature is proposed, followed by a 
description of the operational activities of United Nations base at Brindisi. Then, the 
Peacekeeping operations are put in the context of the lean-agile debate, and possible logistics 
efficiency improvements are proposed.  
Key words: Supply chain management, Supply chain uncertainty, United Nation Logistics 
Base, Brindisi, Lean logistics, Agile Logistics 
Introduction 
Statistics on the number of countries where United Nations intervention forces are stationed 
show a steadily rising trend. Managing supply chains in the uncertain circumstances of these 
countries is a complex undertaking in the best of cases. Although the literature on the supply 
chain humanitarian missions has demonstrated a similarly increasing trend, much of the 
research is mostly descriptive.  Whereas the description of the wide range of challenges facing 
the supply chain is the invaluable, better, theory-based understanding of these particular 
supply chain environments is needed. Such better understanding will facilitate further learning 
and enable more specific practical recommendations that will contribute to a improvement in 
the efficiency and effectiveness of humanitarian interventions. This paper is an attempt just to 
do make such a contribution. More specifically, we examine the logistics approach of the 
United Nations’ Humanitarian (i.e. Peace Keeping) Missions organized from United Nations’ 
logistics base in Brindisi in Italy through the lens of the lean vs. agile approach.  Our paper is 
in part based on the analysis of the case “The Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations: 
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The logistics of the Intervention” (Borla, 2006) and in part, on a synthesis of pertinent 
concepts drawn from the supply chain management literature.   
Our approach is based on four main premises derived from the aforementioned 
literature: First, in order to optimally manage a supply chain, one has to specify the nature of 
the environment as, to a large extent; it will define the challenges inherent to that supply chain 
environment. Second, possible solutions will have to be assessed taking into consideration the 
demands and requirements of all involved stakeholders. Third, to effectively implement and 
manage the proposed supply chain solution, the structure has to fit the needs and capabilities 
of the organization as well as that of other supply chain partners. Fourth, appropriate 
management policies and actions need to be integrated with an on-going effectiveness 
assessment and co-ordination among partners.  
We find that peacekeeping operations differ from other humanitarian relief operations 
in their less immediate character and prolonged duration. Deployments of peacekeeping 
operations tend to require more time to get established but at the same time, take place over a 
longer period of time. These different characteristics point to a need for leaner supply chains. 
This in turn suggests the possibility, of adopting efficiency improvement strategies akin to 
those used in business environments.  
We conclude that more grounded research is needed to provide a further development 
of the conceptual framework of supply chains in the context of peacekeeping operations. The 
relevance of our approach is underscored by the increasing requests for resources from 
member states of the United Nations, which are in turn driven by a growing need for 
simultaneous interventions.    
The supply chain performance context 
In supply chain management research, much debate during the last decade has been dedicated 
to the relative merits of the so-called “lean” and “agile” paradigms in supply chain 
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management. Leanness means developing a value stream to eliminate all waste, including 
buffer stocks and time, and to ensure a level schedule (Naylor, Berry, Naim, 1997; Aitken et 
al, 2005). In the context of the peace keeping operations, leanness refers to avoiding peaks 
and troughs in field requirements.. The leanness concept resonates with the concept of 
efficiency of operations (Mentzer and Konrad, 1991). There is evidence to suggest that level 
scheduling combined with the elimination of waste (in terms of space and in time) has 
successfully delivered a wide range of products to those operations where financial resources 
are scarce (Aitken et al, 2002).  
However, there are many other circumstances where the need for supplies is volatile 
and where availability is the key to securing a successful intervention. In such contexts, a 
much higher level of agility is required (Aitken et al, 2002). Agility is defined as an 
organization-wide capability that embraces organizational structures, information systems, 
logistics processes, and mindsets (Christopher and Towill, 2000, Naylor et al, 1997). It refers 
to using field knowledge to exploit the most effective opportunities in the given operational 
context (Aitken et al. 2005). Agility could be construed as a broader conceptualization of the 
need for responsiveness to the changing needs of evolving intervention suggested by 
Richardson and Gordon (1980).  
As can be gleaned from the above definitions, leanness and agility can be seen as a set 
of organizational capabilities that concern many of the organization’s functions including 
assortment composition, planning, procurement, storage, and distribution.  
In the Supply Chain context, the main operational performance drivers relate to the 
management of inventory, transportation, facilities and information. Chopra and Meindl 
(2001) describe these four drivers as follows:  
(1) Inventory – Inventory refers to all the raw materials, work in progress and finished goods 
of the organization. Inventory levels are a powerful tool that influences the supply chain’s 
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efficiency and responsiveness. Through their reduction organization become more 
efficient as it lowers their inventory carrying costs. However, maintaining minimum 
inventory levels may compromise the organization’s ability to respond to sudden surges in 
requirements. Maintaining higher levels of inventory contributes to an organization’s 
ability to respond promptly. However these additional inventories increase the overall 
costs by locking up capital in inventory carrying costs. In addition, they also increase the 
risk of product damage obsoleteness.  
(2) Transportation – Transportation refers to the movements of inventory from one point in a 
supply chain to another. Reducing minimum shipping quantities might benefit immediate 
response time but it will decrease transport efficiency and increase costs.  
(3) Facilities. The facilities in the supply chain context encompass all places in the network 
where inventory is stored, assembled or fabricated. A higher density of facilities will 
enhance responsiveness but reduce efficiency by increasing costs. In the particular context 
of humanitarian relief case, dispersing inventory over a wider geographical area 
potentially implies facing additional safety concerns that might further increase costs due 
to a greater need for security.  
(4) Information. Finally, the information consists of data and analysis regarding the inventory, 
transportation, facilities and customers throughout the supply chain. Information is 
potentially the biggest driver of performance in the supply chain as it directly affects each 
of the other drivers. In environments prone to instability, such as the ones in our case, a 
highly dispersed network strongly increases the need for information yet at the same time, 
it increases the threat of an obstructed flow of accurate and timely information. 
Table 1 shows how the application of leanness and agility approach influences an 
organization’s supply chain performance drivers. To make its supply chain leaner, 
organizations attempt to reduce their inventory levels and increase minimum shipping 
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quantities (so as to reduce transportation costs). Less dense networks of facilities contribute to 
elimination of waste and reduce the exposure to potentially hostile elements (stealing/attacks). 
Gaining more precise and detailed information on the requirements and preferences of 
different members of the supply chain facilitates supply chain officers’ ability to optimize the 
supply chain performance drivers, regardless of whether the organization aims to have lean or 
agile operations.  
Table 1: Application of the leanness and agility paradigm to the supply chain performance 
drivers 
 Lean Agile 
Inventory levels Decrease Increase 
Transportation costs (Minimum order quantity) Increase Decrease 
Facilities density Decrease Increase 
Information  Increase Increase 
In short, supply chain officers are appointed to enhance organizations’ effectiveness 
by managing the supply chain drivers such as to reduce waste whilst assuring responsiveness 
to demand fluctuations. The appropriate management of these drivers, furthermore, helps 
keeping costs associated with operating the supply chain at lowest possible levels whilst 
avoiding erroneous deliveries, undesired supply delays or full stock-outs.  
The ideal supply chain, however, is likely to embody both lean and agile principles to 
ensure the highest level of responsiveness combined with low costs and efficient processes. 
The particular supply chain configuration that describes such upstream processes has been 
termed as “leagile” (Naylor, Naim and Berry, 1999). Lean processes upstream facilitate a low 
cost and low risk supply chain whilst agile processes downstream assure high levels of 
responsiveness to the needs in the field. The agility of the latter processes is achieved through 
creating higher strategic buffers (inventories) at the lower end of the supply chain and the 
postponement of product customization. Towill and Christopher (2002) contend that the lean 
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and agile paradigms operate at different times in the same place or at the same time in 
different places of the supply chain. In other words, an organization might simultaneously 
operate the leanest agile system and the most responsive lean system. In humanitarian relief 
environments, the optimal position on the lean-leagile-agile continuum will differ from item 
to item and from mission to mission. The definition of the best approach will therefore require 
continuous revision. What might be the optimal approach for one field operation might not be 
adequate for another. Ultimately, the choice of the main focus of the supply chain 
management efforts (be it lean or agile) depends on the composition of the market 
winners/market qualifiers (Hill 1993, Towill and Christopher 2002). Market qualifiers refer to 
competitive pre-requisites which represent a base level of performance, whilst order winners 
refer to critical differentiating factors.  
Risk and uncertainty 
Whereas for many commercial organizations, the understanding and appreciation of supply 
chain vulnerability and its managerial counterpart - supply chain risk management - are still in 
their infancy (Jüttner et al., 2003), it has been a fact of life of those involved in military 
interventions. Research sponsored by the UK Department for Transport in 2004, found that 
even when organizations face supply chain-related threats, they have difficulties identifying, 
assessing and managing the underlying risks. A thorough understanding of the scope and the 
nature of supply chain risks is therefore a key hurdle that organizations must overcome.  
The assessment of Supply Chain uncertainty  
To gain a sound understanding of supply chain issues at play, it is imperative to develop 
conceptual models that explain the most pertinent risk management issues. The need for such 
models is likely to increase given progressive fragmentation and recombination of supply 
chains and emphasis on revenue management and its impact on the supply chain performance, 
to name just a few factors (Seshadri & Subrahmanyam, 2005). To maintain the overview in a 
  8
situation of increasing supply chain fragmentation, it is essential that the value of each 
component in this supply chain is accurately determined.  This calls for a clear understanding 
of the responsibilities, performance and the effects of the actions of each member on the 
supply chain as a whole.  
Substantial research has been dedicated to managing disruption risks in supply chains 
in order to make these chains more resilient and reduce the effect of disruptions. Much of this 
research relates to the development of frameworks based on premises of industrial risk 
management. For example, Haines (1998) and Kleindorfer & Saad (2005) use a four step 
approach:  
1. Hazards: In order to manage risk, one has to specify the nature of underlying hazard that 
gives rise to the risk. In case of the intervention forces, it is imperative that an accurate 
inventory is made of the most immediate and threatening factors to the mission. 
2. Pathways: Risks are quantified through a comprehensive assessment process that 
includes the determination of the pathways through which disruption risks might be 
triggered.  
3. Alignment with decision environment: To be effective, risk management approach must 
fit the characteristics and the needs of the decision environment. The dynamics and 
needs of different supply chain environments will give rise to differences in approaches 
to assessment and design. Despite the often immediate need for stability and relief, the 
decision environment of the United Nations, often includes a strong political element 
(i.e. specific preferences of the members states) that potentially can altering or slow 
down the decision making process. 
4. Implementation: Ultimately, appropriate management policies and actions need to be 
integrated with ongoing risk assessment and coordination amongst supply chain 
partners.  
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Much more detailed but similar in approach are the best practices identified by Elkins et 
al (2005), developed based on surveys and interviews with leaders of global best-in-class 
organizations. Some suggestions that can be taken from these best practices include:  
(1) Require critical suppliers and collaborators to produce a detailed disruption-awareness 
plan and or business continuity plan; 
(2) Require suppliers and collaborators to be prepared to electronically share timely 
information and visibility of material flows with your organization; 
(3) Conduct a detailed performance report and analysis following every intervention (see 
Peace keeping best practices web  page: 
http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/pbpu/) 
(4) Gather supply chain intelligence and monitor critical supply-base locations; 
(5) Improve visibility of inventory buffers in domestic distribution channels at the part 
level; 
(6) Classify buffered material by its criticality; 
(7) Train key employees and groups to improve real time decision making capabilities;; 
(8) Understand the cost trade-offs for different risk mitigation strategies; 
These best practices are based on initiatives that commercial companies currently have 
in place or are working toward. Interestingly, no single company in the Elkins’ research has 
implemented all of the practices.   
The benefits of Resilient Supply Chains 
It is needless to emphasize that the immediate victims of civil unrest or natural disasters may 
be indifferent as to why or where a disruption has occurred. What matters to them is that they 
receive aid or that the forced have then materials to bring the stability to the region. 
Therefore, in a globe spanning supply chain environment the provides resources to highly 
unstable environments, the intervention forces with the most resilient and responsive supply 
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chain will be best able to carry our the mandate given to them by the international community  
(Elkins et al, 2005). 
Common wisdom and the literature (Towill and Christopher, 2003) points to agile or 
leagile approaches to environments of high uncertainty, as are peacekeeping operations. 
However, as we discuss bellow, increased agility in the case of the Brindisi base is negated by 
non-logistics issues such as the allocation of troops and budget from member states. Increased 
efficiency on the other hand can be achieved by current supply chain and logistics practices, 
facilitating the accomplishment of operations restricted by budget considerations in an 
increasingly complex environment. 
The Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations: 
The logistics of the Intervention 
Within the United Nations, the power and responsibility to institute and maintain peace 
keeping operations rests with the Security Council. At the operational level, the Department 
of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), instituted in 1992, has the mandate for the planning, 
preparation and directing these peace operations, which are considered the United Nations’ 
instrument to help countries suffering from conflicts to create conditions for sustainable 
peace.  
At present, there are sixteen ongoing peace keeping missions and two political 
missions (Fig. 1). Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, 62 of such missions have 
taken place, 15 prior to1990 and more than 40 ever since). During these missions, military 
contingents and/or military observers that are provided by the member states of the United 
Nations. Seven of these missions have a more permanent character. Some of the missions are 
financed with the regular budget of the United Nations. 
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Figure 1 (from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp) 
The budget of these operations exceeds 5 billions of dollars for the current fiscal year. 
Military staff exceeds 80,000 and civilian staff 15,000 from across 114 countries (fig. 2).  
 
 
Figure 2 - Budget of Peacekeeping operations (Borla 2006) 
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To illustrate the magnitudes of the entire United Nations Peace Keeping operations; in 
2004 the DPKO transported 580,000 passengers during 90,000 hours of flight, mobilized 
470,000 tons of cargo and managed a fleet of 319 planes and helicopters. 
The Organizational Structure of the DPKO 
At present the DPKO is divided in 2 offices; the Office of Operations, which essentially takes 
care of political issues and the Office for Mission Support (OMS). The OMS in turn is again 
divided in two divisions; the Logistics Division and the Administrative Division. The Logistic 
Division is responsible for the coordination of activities related to information, 
telecommunication, health, engineering, transportation (air and land), and supply of materials 
for construction and maintenance of missions. The proposed organization for the Logistic 
Division of the OMS for 2006-2007 includes some 182 persons and is structured in three 
Services (fig. 3): the Operational Support Service; the Specialist Support Service and the 
Communications and Information Service Technology. 
 
Figure 3. Organization of the Logistics Division of the DPKO (Borla 2006) 
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The Office of Aviation Safety controls the flight security through external contractors 
as the United Nations itself does not possess any aircraft. This unit is not a part of the Air 
Transportation Section, in order to assure its objectivity and transparency. 
The Operational Support Service too is divided in two sections: Logistic Operations 
and Logistics Policy. The former coordinates the logistic operations of interfaces (such as 
engineering and materials flows) between troops (also referred to as the Blue Helmets) and 
the civil administration of the United Nations. The latter takes care of the definition of the 
policies and technical normative of the intervention. 
Specialist Support Service (SSS) is constituted of seven sections: Air Transport; 
Surface transport; Medical; Supplies; Contingent Owned Equipment (COE); and Engineering 
and Cartography. The Air Transport section assists the missions in the activities arranging air 
transport, conducted by external contractors, in all contractual aspects. The Surface Transport 
Service has similar functions, although in this case the vehicles actually belong to the United 
Nations. The Medical Support Service, other than the complex exercise of coordination of 
several missions, has a normative task of standardization of doctors, budget preparation, 
contracts, and location of the doctor-sanitary materials and management of refresher courses. 
The Supply Service takes care of (a) the preparation of the technical detailed lists of material 
demands for the exercise of peace operations (e.g., food supplies, potable water, gasoline); (b) 
administration of this material and the contractual aspects. The activities of procurement and 
contract bids are directed by an external office to the DPKO belonging to the Department of 
Management of the Secretariat. For each mission a decentralized office of procurement 
handles amounts up to $200.000, operating independently from Headquarters in New York. 
Materials management (COE) belongs to troops participants to missions and coordinates the 
complex negotiations and technical detailed lists between troops of the Member States and 
those of the United Nations. Engineering takes care of technical norms and policies for the 
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standardization of the engineering activities; technical detailed lists for bids; technical 
assistance to the missions; training of the staff; and the management, through a computing 
network, of engineering materials of the SDS. Cartography supplies cartographic technical 
assistance and logistic assistance in the field (e.g.: identification of optimal sites for the 
construction of military encampments). Communications and Information Technology 
operates and manages, through UNLB, all computer telecommunications equipment. This 
Service maintains in real time a databases relative to materials and staff. 
Minimum Requirements for a Successful  Peace Keeping Operation. 
In 2000 Lakhdar Brahimi, adviser to the General Secretary, supervised the preparation of a 
document (A/55/305-S/200/809) which proposed the minimum requirements for a successful  
peace operation. These requirements included: 
i) The creation of a new function close to DPKO in New York dedicated to the logistic 
and administrative support its operations; 
ii) The institution of a mechanism for financing new and unexpected operations; 
iii) The creation of strategic material reserves (Strategic Deployment Stock, SDS) near the 
logistics base of Brindisi in Italy.  
These recommendations introduce more specific indications for the logistic of 
operations, among which:  
• The ability to deploy missions within 30 (or 90 days for one complex missions1) 
counting from the date of adoption of one resolution of the Security Council 
(recommendation no.7) 
                                                 
1 A complex operation employs, by definition, at least 10,000 military troops, 1000 observers and 1000 civil 
employees of civil administration (local and international personal); a traditional operation employs instead not 
more than 5000 troops, 200 military observatories and 200 civil staff (ref. par. 113, doc. A/55/977). 
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• The authorization to hold start-up kits at the UNLB for a minimum of at least 5 
peacekeeping operations. These kits, which are part of the Strategic Deployment Stocks 
(SDS), include the  basic equipment (such as for telecommunications, computers, etc.) 
necessary to start an operation (recommendation n.13, b).  
The Logistics Base of Brindisi   
The United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, in southern Italy, which has been 
operating since 1994, reports to the Logistic Division of the DPKO. This base was instituted 
after an agreement signed between the United Nations and the Italian Republic and occupies 
infrastructure of a former base of the Italian Air Force. The main reasons of this choice for 
this location were the stable location and good infrastructures. 
The mandate of the UNLB includes the following services: (1) the management of 
assets and infrastructures, (2) supplies and the management of warehouses, (3) a center of 
telecommunications and computing, (4) a training center, (5) the coordination of the air 
operations and (6) administration. In the warehouses of the UNLB the necessary materials for 
the assembly and the maintenance of peace operations are stored. These stocks are also being 
referred to as the Strategic Deployment Stocks. In order to successfully fulfill its objectives 
the UNLB, similar to any professional logistics operation must meet the performance criteria 
typical of supply chain management. 
Strategic Deployment Stock  
The Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) are the material reserves kept to support rapid 
deployment and initial operational establishment of complex United Nations' peace keeping 
missions. The plans for the implementation of SDS have been under review since the early 
nineties (e.g., DA PAM 700–31 1994) and were finally endorsed by the Brahimi report of 
2000.  
  16
In June 2002, the General Assembly in resolution 56/292, approved the 
implementation of the Strategic Deployment Stocks for complex missions and dedicated 
$141.5 million for this purpose. Since then equipment with a worth of over $165 million has 
been issued; most recently supporting the deployment of missions in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Burundi, Haiti, Iraq, Sudan and the expansion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The 
fact that some 75% of the budget has been dedicated to deployments to Africa underscores the 
location choice of Brindisi. 
The Strategic Deployment Stocks are classified in eight main categories; Facilities and 
Infrastructures, Ground Transportation, Communication, Information Technology, Medical 
Equipment, Special Equipment, Temporal Generic Assistance and Miscellaneous Supplies. 
Approximately 84% of the budget concentrated in the first three categories.  In 2005, an 
analysis of the experiences for the first three years of SDS’ implementation was reported in 
document A/59/701. It was found that the SDS had served the purposed of fast deployment of 
peacekeeping operations. However, numerous opportunities for improvement too were 
identified, among which: 
• A reconfiguration of the composition of SDS, implying changes in the type, quantity 
and replacement costs of replenishments; transfer of equipment from United Nations 
reserve stocks; rotation of the stocks through existing missions and other United Nations 
entities; and procurement. It was concluded that the management of the SDS requires 
more flexible methods to reconfigure SDS composition. 
• To accelerate the redeployment rate, the inventory levels of long lead-time items will 
need to be increased and the stocking of short lead-time items reduced appropriately. 
Currently lead time for the procurement of SDS equipment varies from 30 to 360 days. 
Whereas for most equipment lead times are less than 120 days, many specialized high-
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value items, like ambulances, fire-engines and material handling equipment have longer 
lead-times of up to 360 days. 
• The provision for up to five simultaneous missions has to be increased as it is already  
overloaded by current demand. 
• Budget replenishment has to be accelerated. The General Assembly, in its resolution 
56/292, approved a replenishment policy for SDS whereby mission budgets, when 
approved by the Assembly, would pay for the replacement of stocks drawn from SDS. 
Replenishment from approved mission budgets however, takes approximately 150 days, 
(including 60 days before the mandate), due to the need to be authorized by the 
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. This delay in the 
replenishment of SDS from the time a commitment authority is approved until the time 
a new peacekeeping mission budget is approved could diminish its ability to support 
other new missions.  
Based on the experience acquired through the surge in peacekeeping missions during the 
recent years, the general assembly meeting (A/59/296 and 299) has requested:  
• To review the composition of strategic deployment stocks, included the introduction of a 
“fly away kit” (transportable with airplanes) for the immediate construction of new 
missions and; 
• To reconsider the operating functions of the Logistics base in Brindisi (UNLB). The 
current agenda for reform (referred to as the Peace Operations 2010 plan) proposes 
further restructuring of the DPKO, with the introduction of substantial changes in 2010.  
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Discussion 
At the strategic level 
Peacekeeping operations cannot be easily classified within the traditional frameworks used for 
effectiveness-efficiency analysis, sketched in the first section of this paper. On the one hand, 
deployments do not have the urgency of disaster relief operations. In fact they have a 
standardized reaction time of at least 30 days. On the other hand, the operations tend to last 
longer and a growing number of them can be organized simultaneously. Arguably, a reduction 
in reaction time cannot only be driven by an increase of resources (e.g. stocks, air 
transportation). A critical factor in the time-to-deploy is obtaining troops from member states 
at short notice. A report of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (describing the lessons 
learned from the start-up phase of the United Nations mission in Liberia, 2004) states that 
“one of the reasons for delays in deployment was that a number of countries that had offered 
troops, subsequently had to obtain legislative or executive approvals before confirming their 
offers. In addition to that, one key contingent pulled out following its pre-deployment 
reconnaissance mission to Liberia. DPKO also experienced some difficulty in generating 
specialized units”. Thus, increasing the agility of the supply chain through additional stock 
and equipment buffers will not likely have a large impact vis-à-vis political barriers. A more 
lean approach could therefore be more appropriate in the light of the continuous increases in 
expenditure in a public institution. We argue that the adoption of business logistics practices 
can be used to address these issues, as discussed below. 
At the tactical level 
Fontaine (1998) cites a number of key reasons for the hampering logistics support in four 
post-cold war interventions (Desert Shield & Storm, Restore Hope and Joint Endeavor). 
Amongst those reasons were; limited asset visibility, complications in building and 
maintaining time-phased force deployment plans and of ambiguity in the command and 
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control structure. These issues have been successfully (be it arguably) addressed by the 
DPKO and the establishment of the UNLB at the Brindisi base. Much remains to be done, 
however, at the tactical level as can be deduced from the A/59/701 report, described in the 
previous section. Among the issues discussed in this report are: 
• The out-of-balanced distribution of material stocks among bases. This can be address by 
transshipment practices, especially among neighboring bases. The modeling and handling 
of these practices has long been study in the literature and applied in the field, e.g., 
Sherbrooke (1992), Axsäter (1990). 
• Long procurement lead-times (up to one year). E-procurement practices, including 
automation of workflows could help to address this issue. 
• Fixed composition of Strategic Deployments Stocks. SDS have to be adapted flexibly to 
the needs of the field-bases. Common practices in logistics platforms and in mass-
customization can help to address this issue.  
• Non-integrated information systems. United Nations’ inventory information system 
(called Galileo), for example, is not integrated with the management accounting modules. 
An extended body of knowledge exists on ERP implementation that could address this 
issue. 
• Long authorization processes for outgoing shipments to missions. Materials ready to be 
deployed can get stuck for months at the Brindisi base. This is caused by the decentralized 
approach in the ordering from field bases which are frequently operating in hostile and 
difficult environments. Logistics processes at field bases therefore should be simplified 
towards a more centralized approach, “push” style. Furthermore the adoption of MRP 
practices are currently being considered to address this issue.   
• Time consuming inspection of received materials at bases. Once equipment and materials 
have been dispatched to field bases, they have to be thoroughly inspected in a time 
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consuming process. This issue too is related to the need for simplification of logistic 
processes at field bases. The adoption of Jidoka (or quality at the origin) practices could 
also address this issue. 
• Some equipment (e.g. medical equipment) requires specialized handling. This issue is 
being address by outsourcing it’s handling to specialized third party logistics companies. 
• Low rotation of stocks and the number of items, and in particular short-shelf life items. 
The utilization of multi-echelon inventory models coupled to real-time inventory systems 
and transshipment practices would help to addressing this issue.    
• Vulnerability due to over-centralization at Brindisi. Although this goes against lean 
principles, selective decentralization/duplication of critical functions can make Brindisi 
less vulnerable. This issue is already being partially dealt with through the planned 
establishment of a new base near Barcelona, Spain, which is going to handle all critical 
information and databases. 
• Slow deployment times caused by the many afore mentioned constraints mentioned.  This 
issue can be addressed by improving logistics practices and by the adoption of 
standardized “fly-away” kits, currently under consideration.  
• Reconstitution and redeployment of stocks. Reception proceedings of materials at the 
Brindisi base can take up to six weeks. This delay is partially produced by capacity 
limitations due to increase in the number of missions, but also because many items are 
received in bulk and have to be repackaged. Better integration with key suppliers could 
help to addressing this issue. 
• Shipments do not carry bar codes, thus tracking and tracing (i.e. visibility) remains 
seriously impaired. The adoption of standard tracking techniques, possibly including 
RFID could address this issue and also facilitate the inspection of materials at reception. 
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• Materials are not deployed in sealed containers. Doing so however will reduce losses in 
the field and therefore greatly simplify the activities at field bases.  
Table 2. Current logistics issues 
Current logistics issues Business logistics practices 
Balance of material among bases Lateral transshipments 
Procurement lead-times of 30 to 360 days e-procurement principles 
Fixed composition of SDS Flexible configuration to field base needs 
Inventory Mgmt. System not integrated ERP principles implementation 
Long waiting for shipping authorization Use push/MRP principles 
Time consuming inspection at reception in the field Implement Jidoka principles: inspect at source 
Specialized handling  of medical equipment Outsourcing to specialized 3PL 
Low rotation of items with short-shelf lives Multiechelon logistics practices 
Risk of over-centralization Selective decentralization 
Slow deployment “Fly-away kits”, 3 & 4 PL practices 
Reconstitution  & redeployment of stocks Integration with key suppliers 
Lack of traceability Standard bar-code/RFID tracking techniques 
Lack of containerization Implement containerization 
All above issues are being acknowledged by the United Nations. Clearly a systematic 
adoption of business logistics practices and the institution of a Chief Logistics Officer with 
enough authority to implement this would greatly improve the leanness of the operations at 
Brindisi. 
Conclusion 
Peacekeeping operations have some of the supply chain and logistics elements of 
humanitarian relief and of military interventions. However, they differ from humanitarian 
relief both in the need for a speedy deployment and in its duration. In particular, peacekeeping 
operations tend to be characterized by slower yet longer deployments, implying the need for 
leaner supply chains.  
Clearly, more research, possibly of a grounded theory nature, is needed to provide a 
conceptual framework of supply chains in the context of peacekeeping operations. At a more 
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tactical level, possible sources of improvement of peacekeeping operations extend beyond 
logistics. Loewenberg (2006), for example, cites conflicts arising from multiple interfaces 
with the media. Abraszewski et al (1995) emphasizes issues of personnel rotation and 
benefits. We argue that the application of formal supply chain and logistics principles, 
validated through more formal inductive techniques could facilitate the transfer of best 
practices developed in the civilian world to the support peacekeeping operations. We find that 
peacekeeping operations differ from those of humanitarian relief both in the need for a speedy 
deployment and in its duration. Peacekeeping operations call for slower but longer 
deployments, necessitating leaner supply chains. 
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